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HENRY MANNE AND NONPUBLIC COMPANY
DISCLOSURE
Houman B. Shadabo
This essay discusses Henry Manne's 1974 article, Economic Aspects
of Required Disclosure Under Federal Securities Law,' and its application
to nonpublic disclosure regimes such as that applicable to hedge funds and
startups crowdfunding capital under the Jumpstart Our Business Startups
Act of 2012.
I. MANNE AND THE ECONOMICS OF DISCLOSURE REGULATION
In the Economic Aspects of Required Disclosure Under Federal Secu-
rities Law, Manne makes numerous broad critiques against mandatory secu-
rities disclosure in general and some specifics required by the Securities
Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
("Exchange Act"). This section briefly summarizes key aspects of Manne's
article.
Manne begins by noting that disclosure law has its roots in the narrow-
ly tailored and low-cost common law fiduciary duties and 19th century in-
corporation acts that required disclosure of material facts.2 In Manne's
view, this "era of relative laissez-faire in the market for information about
stocks"3 came to and end with the wide-ranging and detailed requirements
found in the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. He observed that, at the
time, economists had significant doubt about the whether the statutes re-
sulted in optimal disclosures. Indeed, Manne notes that based on the best
available evidence, there is no reason to believe that fraud was a significant
problem prior to passage of the Securities Acts.4 Importantly, Manne notes,
the fact that most companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange were
voluntarily disclosing the most important type of information that was sub-
sequently mandated indicates that competitive pressures from investors
* Professor of Law, Co-Director, Center for Business and Financial Law, New York Law School.
Henry G. Manne, Economic Aspects of Required Disclosure Under Federal Securities Law, in
WALL ST. IN TRANSITION: THE EMERGING SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY 23 (Henry G.
Manne & Ezra Solomon eds. 1974).
2 Id. at 23.
3 Id. at 25.
4 Id at 27. The lack of rampant securities fraud or market manipulation prior to the Great De-
pression has also been confirmed by recent research. See PAUL MAHONEY, WASTING A CRISIS: WHY
SECURITIES REGULATION FAILS (2015).
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required them to do so.5 Market forces were clearly at work in the market
for information.
Manne criticizes the view that mandatory disclosure is non-regulatory,
or non-substantive, due to it forcing companies to undertake activities that
they would not otherwise.6 Manne notes, for example, that the Securities
Act requires the disclosure of certain undertakings and that financial state-
ments conform to generally accepted accounting principles-despite the
fact that such are not universally undertaken or desirable.7
Manne attacks the public goods justification for mandatory disclosure,
which holds that firms will voluntarily disclose a suboptimal amount of
information because they cannot capture its benefits (which are dispersed
widely among investors in a non-rivalrous manner).8 He first criticizes the
public goods-efficiency justification for mandatory disclosure on the
grounds that it may undermine productive efficiency by reducing the incen-
tive to produce in the first place. He also argues that there is a related prob-
lem with placing questions about disclosure requirements and enforcement
at the discretion of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). More
fundamentally, Manne argues against the public goods nature of financial
information due to its rapid absorption into the prices of securities. Infor-
mation is consumed by investors when it is disclosed, thereby becoming
less valuable, and different, to those that fail to immediately trade upon it.
This rationale would not apply to the extent securities are not publicly trad-
ed, such as private company shares.
Manne views mandatory disclosure for public companies as a form of
anti-competitive rent-seeking, whereby incumbent firms gain an advantage
by imposing regulatory requirements on existing and potential competitors
that are less able to comply.9 As evidence of this phenomenon, Manne ob-
serves that the underwriting practices used by the leading Wall Street un-
derwriters were essentially codified into the Securities Act. Accordingly,
he argues, doing so placed Wall Street underwriters at a competitive ad-
vantage to smaller underwriting firms with different practices targeted to
relatively high-risk issuers."0 He also notes the inherently regressive nature
of mandatory disclosure, due to larger public companies, sell more shares
than smaller ones, thereby better absorbing the disclosures costs applicable
to both." Likewise, smaller companies that privately issue securities may
be disproportionately impacted by mandatory disclosures due to generally
being higher-risk than established firm and lacking audited financial state-
5 d. at 23.
6 Id. at 29.
7 Manne, supra note 1, at 30.
8 Id. at 40-4 1.
9 Id. at 31-32.
10 Id. at 35-36.
11 Id. at 48-49.
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ments and a track record upon which to base their disclosures. 12 Whether or
not firms actually use disclosure rules to benefit themselves at the expense
of their competitors, it is important to note that mandatory disclosure has a
competitive impact and produces both winners and losers.
In addition to the observation that any disclosure is costly, Manne
notes that mandates may have broader costs because disclosures may have
zero or negative value to investors. For example, he argues that most in-
formation mandated to be disclosed on Form S-i for new issues is not val-
ued by investors due to it being out of date. 3 Manne notes an admission by
a then-SEC commissioner that mandatory quarterly disclosures are not val-
uable due to much of the information being stale by the time it is disclosed.
He criticizes the Securities Act more broadly on the grounds that it likely
requires disclosure of irrelevant information and not information investors
would want to know about.' 4 Prospectuses are unread because they are not
useful, a result driven in part by the boilerplate language used to avoid lia-
bility. 15
All mandatory disclosure regimes suffer from a fundamental flaw in
Manne's view in that no amount of information about the past can suffi-
ciently predict the future-and hence investors' returns. 6 Implicit in these
criticisms of mandatory disclosure is that, to the extent investors rely on the
disclosure, a market for lemons is created. If the information is stale and
has no value, investors cannot distinguish between good and bad firms, and
will therefore discount all companies accordingly. The only benefits that
Manne recognizes from Securities Act disclosures are providing the SEC
with a powerful enforcement device, competitors with valuable infor-
mation, and securities analysts with fodder for their research. 7
Another cost of mandatory disclosure is revealing irrelevant infor-
mation that investors falsely believe is relevant, such as financial statements
subject to the SEC's conservative accounting rules. 8 In this, Manne is im-
plicitly arguing against a one-size-fits-all approach to accounting stand-
ards-even among public companies-and making an observation con-
sistent with the large body of disclosure-based accounting research that has
emerged in recent decades. Mandatory disclosure also places a cost on
relatively less risk-averse investors seeking to invest in small, high-risk
companies that are unable to make the disclosures required of public com-
panies. 9
12 Id. at 49.
13 Id. at37.
14 Id. at 44-45.
15 Id. at44-45,47.
16 Manne, supra note 1, at 52.
17 Id. at 38-39.
18 Id. at 39, 43-44.
19 Id. at 50-51.
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Manne also recognizes that regulation of public companies creates dif-
ferent disclosure regimes-public and private-each with relative costs and
benefits.2" Accordingly, he notes evidence supporting the theory that man-
datory disclosure increases private placements due to its costs. 21 And in
recognizing the relative costs of being public or private, Manne notes that
while private placements may generally be more attractive, a proposed SEC
rule would have made them relatively less attractive compared to going
public.22 When companies have a choice among disclosure regimes, the
relative costs of disclosure matter.
Although not made explicit in Manne's article, he would likely oppose
any form of mandatory disclosure on the basic economic grounds that the
market for information is fundamentally functional. Given that at least
some significant portion of investors demand disclosure, firms would dis-
close valuable information voluntarily, and efficient capital markets would
set the proper price. Indeed, this is more likely the case now than it was
when Manne was writing, due to the growing institutionalization-and
hence sophistication-of public company investors.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF DISCLOSURE
The empirical and theoretical study of business disclosure, and related
areas such as accounting standards and regulation, has grown into a vast
space since the publication of Manne's 1974 article. The literature address-
es issues relating to the nature, content, form, timing, costs and benefits,
and law and standards of disclosure. In recent years, there have been sever-
al lengthy reviews of the vast literature.23 This section summarizes general
findings to give a broader context of Manne's article.
Extensive research has found that disclosure has benefits. Disclosure
reduces information asymmetry by informing investors before they pur-
chase securities. It also reduces agency costs while they remain investors.24
Specific benefits from disclosure are increasing investors' willingness to
purchase shares, a lower cost of capital, and higher market liquidity for
20 Id. at 47.
21 Id. at 47-48.
22 Id. at 48.
23 See generally Christian Luez & Peter Wysocki, Economic Consequences of Financial Report-
ing and Disclosure Regulation: A Review and Suggestions for Future Research, 50 J. ACCT. & ECON.
525 (2016); Anne Beyer et al., The Financial Reporting Environment: Review of the Recent Literature,
50 J. ACCT. & ECON. 296 (2010). However, one area that seems severely underdeveloped is research
about private company disclosures.
24 Ann Gaeremynck & Mathijs Van Peteghem, Costs and Benefits of Disclosure, in THE
ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO ACCOUNTING, REPORTING AND REGULATION 144, 145 (Carien van Mourik
& Peter Walton eds., 2014).
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securities." These benefits generally apply to both equity holders and debt
holders. 6 Driving these benefits is the fact that investors demand some
level of disclosure and punish firms they deem opaque. 7 In new, entrepre-
neurial ventures, information asymmetry and agency costs may be particu-
larly acute. 8 However, mandatory disclosure may be relatively ineffective
and costly for such companies. They likely lack a track record, and disclo-
sure is unable to reduce the radical uncertainty that surrounds new ventures.
Direct costs of disclosure include costs from obtaining, preparing, and
publishing information. 9 These direct costs may have become lower in
recent years through the adoption of information technology, however.
Likewise, the SEC's mandate that companies use machine-readable lan-
guage in financial disclosures in the form of the eXtensible Business Re-
porting Language may make such disclosures more useful to investors in
terms of reducing information asymmetries and agency costs."
Indirect costs of disclosure include those from revealing proprietary
information, verifying the information, and potentially exposing one's risk
to litigation.3' In addition, mandatory disclosure seems to crowd-out private
information production.32 It may also cause managers to focus on short-
term goals or produce hard information at the expense of investment.33
Short-term benefits from higher mandatory disclosure may-be outweighed
in the long run by better operating performance.34
Theoretical research confirms that firms take into account costs and
benefits when making disclosure decisions." Accordingly, if firms have a
choice between disclosure regimes, they will choose the most optimal from
25 Gaeremynck & Peteghem, supra note 24, at 145; Christof Beuselnick, Marc Deloof & Sophie
Manigart, Financial Reporting, Disclosure, and Corporate Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 290,292-93 (Mike Wright et al. eds., 2013).
26 Gaeremynck & Peteghem, supra note 24, at 146.
27 Id. at 145-46.
28 Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experi-
ence, 55 STAN L. REV. 1067, 1076 (2003).
29 Gaeremynck & Peteghem, supra note 24, at 147-48.
30 See, e.g., Joung W. Kim, Jee-Hae Lim & Won Gyun No, The Effect of First Wave Mandatory
XBRL Reporting Across the Financial Information Market, 26 J. INFO. SYvS. 127, (2012).
31 Gaeremynck & Peteghem, supra note 24, at 148; Beuselnick, Deloof & Manigart, supra note
25, at 294.
32 Ya Tang, Information Disclosure and Price Discovery, 19 J. FIN. MKTS. 39, 40 (2014); Brian J.
Bushee & Christian Leuz, Economic Consequences of SEC Disclosure Regulation: Evidence from the
OTC Bulletin Board, 39 J. ACCT. & ECON. 233, 261 (2005).
33 Alex Edmans, Mirko Heinle, & Chong Huang, The Real Cost of Disclosure 4 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19420, 2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/w19420.
34 Tim Jenkinson & Tarun Ramadorai, Does One Size Fit All? The Consequences of Switching
Markets with Different Regulatory Standards, 19 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 852, 884-85 (2013).
35 Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and the
Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature, 31 J. ACCT. & ECON. 405, 406-07,
422 (2001).
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a cost-benefit perspective. Indeed, research has found that private offerings
became more widely used after the passage of the Securities Act and Ex-
change Act.36 This generally supports Manne's view that mandatory disclo-
sure is cost prohibitive for some firms that would otherwise go public. Ma-
honey and Meil find little evidence that the 1930s securities acts reduced
information asymmetry.37
Mandatory disclosure is justified on numerous grounds, including to
prevent opportunism by insiders, as a signal that the firm is willing to dis-
close both positive and negative information, to increase confidence in the
markets, and to produce externalities in the form of valuable information
about other companies.38 For this last justification, information is viewed as
a public good that creates free riders and, as with all such phenomenon, is
insufficiently produced without regulation requiring its production (i.e.,
disclosure).39 Mandatory disclosure is also justified on the grounds that it
provides a commitment mechanism that voluntary disclosure cannot.4"
Overall, the benefits of disclosure at some point become limited, and
may even cause harm, due to investors' cognitive limitations and behavioral
biases. These include limited attention spans and confirmation bias.4
III. DISCLOSURE BY NONPUBLIC COMPANIES
A. The Three-Tiered SEC Disclosure Regime
The U.S. securities law disclosure regime has changed in many fun-
damental ways since Manne's article. Today, instead of public companies
being subject to wide-ranging disclosure rules and private companies sub-
ject to comparatively none, there are three broad disclosures regimes:
36 Gregg A. Jarrell, The Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of the Market for New Security
Issues, 24 J.L. & EcON. 613 (1981); Jurgen Ernstberger, Benedikt Link, Michael Stich, & Oliver Vogler,
The Real Effects of Mandatory Quarterly Reporting, (2016), http://ssm.com/abstract=2604030 (finding
"greater short-termism arising from increased reporting frequency").
37 Paul G. Mahoney & Jianping Mei, Mandatory vs. Contractual Disclosure in Securities markets:
Evidence from the 1930s 28 (Univ. of Va. L. Sch. The John M. Olin Prog. In L. & Econ. Working Paper
Series, Paper 25, 2006).
38 BEUSELNICK, DELOOF & MANIGART, supra note 25 at 296-97.
39 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Inves-
tors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 681 (1984); John C. Coffee Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a
Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 725 (1984).
40 See Lin Cheng, Scott Liao & Haiwen Zhang, The Commitment Effect Versus Information Effect
ofDisclosure Evidence from Smaller Reporting Companies, 88 ACCT. R. 1239 (2013).
41 Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote Toward a More
Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REv. 139, 160-90 (2006). See generally
OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF
MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014).
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* pure private placements (to accredited investors); 42
* a middle-tier that consists of an IPO on-ramp process for emerging growth companies, a
"mini-IPO" under so-called "Regulation A+," and crowdfunding; 43 and
* full-blown public registration subject to federal securities law and exchange listing re-
quirements.
The JOBS Act created all three categories in the middle tier. They are
characterized by small companies not being required to file a public-
company registration statement with the SEC, yet nonetheless being subject
to significant mandatory disclosures at the time of offering, and potentially
periodic reporting as well. Overall, the JOBS Act reduced the disclosure
obligations for companies seeking to raise funds outside of the confines of a
private offering.
Title I of the JOBS Act created a new category of companies under the
Securities Act known as an "emerging growth company" (EGCs) that have
less than $1 billion in revenues in their most recent fiscal year. The purpose
is to create an extended IPO on-ramp process for growing companies that
gives them additional time to adopt the full disclosure and accounting re-
quirements of a public company. Although an EGC must submit a draft
IPO registration statement confidentially to the SEC, an EGC only needs to
make scaled disclosures. Among other reduced disclosures, an EGC does
not need to include certain financial information for periods before those
presented for the IPO, is not required to disclose the relationship between
executive compensation and financial performance, and does not need to
obtain auditor attestation to internal controls.
Under what is widely referred to as "Reg A+," Title IV of the JOBS
Act allows companies to undertake a "mini-IPO" to raise up to $50 million
from the public without being required to comply with the full range of
disclosure and other SEC obligations. Companies are permitted to raise up
to $50 million from freely tradable securities in any twelve month period.
However, under Reg A+, companies are required to file an offering circular
with audited financial statements to the SEC. Under Reg A+ companies are
also permitted to "test the waters" to determine interest in their offering
before making any filings. This helps companies by reducing the risks of
bearing substantial costs only to make a failed offering.
Title III of the JOBS Act created an entirely new regime designed to
enable equity and debt crowdfunding. A company can raise funds by sell-
42 For example, under the widely used Regulation D exemption, there are no limits on offering
amounts and preempts state regulation.
43 Supporting these types of quasi-public companies is the JOBS Act increasing the existing
threshold from 500 to 2000 investors before imposing mandatory Exchange Act periodic reporting and
other requirements on a company.
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ing an unlimited number of unregistered securities to the public-not just
wealthy or sophisticated accredited investors. In any 12-month period, the
rules limit a company to raising $1 million and limit ordinary investors to
investing no more than $100,000. Crowdfunding companies must file Form
C containing extensive disclosures, including about issuer's business, its
capital structure, how its securities were valued, and a narrative of its finan-
cial condition. Companies making a first-time crowdfunding offering of
more than $500,000, but not more than $1 million, are not required to pro-
duce audited financial statements due to the SEC's recognition, in response
to public comments, of the costs involved. Companies raising less than
$500,000 in a crowdfunding need only produce financial statement re-
viewed by an independent accountant or certified by the company's CEO.
In theory, the crowdfunding rules enable small companies to raise small
amounts of funds from numerous investors without costly registration and
compliance requirements.
B. Case Study of Private Disclosures: Hedge Fund Disclosures
Given that Manne would likely support at most an extremely limited
regime common-law driven mandatory disclosure, it is worth exploring
what disclosures would be made by companies to sophisticated yet passive
investors seeking to buy and hold shares in a diversified portfolio. The
disclosures made by startups to venture capital firms are extensive, fre-
quent, and voluntary. However, they are made in the relatively unique cir-
cumstance of a new company seeking not just capital but also the substan-
tive expertise and professional networks provided by VCs. Startups' dis-
closures to VCs are accordingly likely not representative of what voluntary
disclosures to investors would look like without mandates.
The disclosure practices of hedge funds seem to provide a better case
study than startups. Hedge fund investors, as limited partners, are ultimate-
ly passive investors that do not participate in any management decisions.
Accordingly, the disclosures made by hedge funds may better approximate
the type that would be made by companies under a regime without manda-
tory disclosure where investors are sophisticated yet passive.
Notably, hedge fund investors have strong preferences about disclo-
sure. Investors seek disclosures about risk that are comprehensive, intelli-
gible, and anywhere from monthly to real-time. Investors desire detailed
and frequent performance reporting, and to have the fund precisely identify
the fund's investment strategy, so as to monitor the manager's investments
and prevent a deviation from the fund's stated strategy. In practice, an es-
timated 89 percent of hedge funds make at least monthly disclosures to in-
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vestors. 4 In addition to performance, these disclosures typically describe
what returns were attributable to a given strategy and various measures of
risk-adjusted performance. Since the financial crisis of 2008, hedge fund
investors have been receiving greater disclosures and more transparency
from hedge funds. Hedge fund investors demand higher quality operational
practices when they perceive a fund to be organized in a jurisdiction with
lax enforcement or if the fund is less established. Investors also price in the
risk of fraud and other operational problems by paying lower fees to funds
with weaker operational practices.
The voluntary disclosures by hedge funds to their sophisticated inves-
tors seem to confirm a basic proposition supported by Manne's article;
namely, regulation is not required for high-quality disclosures to take place.
C. The Crowdfunding Disclosure Regime and Manne 's Disclosure Cri-
tique
As a form of middle-tier mandatory disclosure, companies raising
funds under any of the three regimes created by the JOBS Act are subject to
greater disclosure requirements and other restrictions than standard private
placements. For this reason alone, their disclosure may not be optimal un-
der Manne's framework simply because they do not reflect what would be
made under a pure make-for information. For example, unlike nonpublic
companies raising capital through traditional private offerings, crowdfund-
ed firms must disclose their capital structure, use of offering proceeds, and
a narrative discussion of their financial condition. They must also amend
Form C to disclose any material changes and make annual reports. Private
placements typically do not have periodic reporting requirements or place
limits on the amounts able to be raised by companies. Unlike private
placement, crowdfunding securities potentially impose strict liability on
funding platforms, companies, and individual officers and directors. As
Manne would note, this likely reduces the usefulness of their disclosures
due to fear of liability.
In accordance with Manne's view, the middle-tier disclosure regime
created by the JOBS Act45 may also have a competitive impact. The JOBS
Act was signed into law by President Obama on April 5, 2012. The interest
groups behind the Act included a wide range of small businesses, entrepre-
neurs, technology industry participants, and investors. Because the Act is
best viewed as a reduction in regulation, Manne's understanding of rent-
seeking regulation does not apply with respective to the public company,
non-public company divide. However, Manne's theory of competitive dis-
44 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, TRANSPARENCY VERSUS RETURNS: THE INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR VIEW OF ALTERNATIVE ASSETS 50 (March 2008).
45 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, 112 P.L. 106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
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closure may apply as between private companies. In theory, at least, pri-
vate companies have a broad range of potential financing options available
to them, including traditional venture capital (VC) firms under a pure pri-
vate offering, as well as crowdfunding under middle-tier disclosure. In
principle, VCs compete with the public to fund new ventures. A trade pub-
lication noted this potential competition:
When equity-based Crowdfund investing first came on the scene earlier this year, there was
talk of how it might possibly "crowd out" venture capitalists. While historically venture cap-
ital firms and angel investors have been the dominant force in early stage financing for
startups, Crowdfund investing, legalized by this year's JOBS Act, is yet another funding
mechanism that will bring a whole new class of investors into the capital markets .... In re-
cent years, VC firms have been criticized for lackluster performance, with only half of fund-
ed startups yielding a return, and although $30 billion has gone into venture-backed compa-
nies in the U.S. this year, venture capital investments have not outperformed the equity mar-
kets in more than a decade . . . . However, with increasing competition from incuba-
tors/accelerators and now equity-based Crowdfund investing, some feel uncertain about the
future of traditional VC and angel investing. The fact is that the startup ecosystem is chang-
ing due to major competition. All this raises the question: will Crowdfunding be a direct
competitor with venture capital and angel investors?
46
Anecdotally, VCs have criticized Title III of the JOBS Act as creating
a regime for only the poorest quality companies of raise funds. Notably,
not a single prominent VC firm filed a comment to the SEC in support of
the agency's crowdfunding proposal or submitted any recommendations on
how to reform the proposal's overly restrictive provisions. Accordingly,
under Manne's competition theory of mandatory disclosure, VCs may be
losers if crowdfunding takes off and takes away potential startups for VCs
to invest in.
Although crowdfunding is subject to less disclosure requirements than
public companies, a lingering question from Manne's analysis is whether an
even less onerous crowdfunding disclosure regime is desirable. Based on
the experience of U.K.-based crowdfunding, the answer seems to be "yes."
The U.K. equity crowdfunding market raised nearly $2 billion in 2014
alone with fraud being a very rare occurrence.47 This is despite the fact that
U.K. crowdfunding is subject to a much lighter disclosure and regulatory
regime than that under the JOBS Act. Although U.K. authorities require
startups using crowdfunding portals to disclose important information about
themselves and monitor their disclosures, the U.K. regime does not require
the disclosure of any specific information and does not impose periodic
46 Simon Erblich, Crowdfunding: Threat or Opportunity for Venture Capitalists and Angel Inves-
tors?, RED HERRING (Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.redherring.com/top-stories/crowdfunding-threat-or-
opportunity-for-venture-capitalists-and-angel-investors/.
47 Global Crowdfunding Market now Worth $30 Billion CONSULTANCY UK (Sept. 14, 2015),
http://www.consultancy.uk/news/2593/global-crowdfunding-market-now-worth-30-billion.
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reporting requirements. 48 Instead of mandatory disclosure, U.K. crowd-
funding portals help determine what startups using their platform should
disclose based on the costs and benefits of disclosure as well as demand
from investors.
CONCLUSION
Even four decades after the publication of Manne's article criticizing
mandatory disclosure, the issues raised and arguments made are still rele-
vant. The impact and proper regulation of disclosure remains an open ques-
tion today. By contrast, less of an open question is the appropriateness of
one-size-fits are disclosure regimes. With the rise of disclosure regimes for
startups and other methods of allocating capital outside the framework of a
full-blown public company regulatory regime, the securities acts that
Manne criticized are becoming increasingly antiquated in retrospect.
48 Financial Conduct Authority, A Review of the Regulatory Regime for Crowdfunding and the
Promotion of Non-readily Realisable Securities by other Media, FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY 1, 6-
9 (2015), http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/crowdfunding-review.pdf. See also Engine Advoca-
cy, Financing the New Innovation Economy: Making Investment Crowdfunding Work Better for
Startups and Investors, ENGINE 1,19-21 (Oct. 2015),
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/571681753c44d835a440c8b5/57323e0ad9fd5607a3d9f66b/57323e
14d9fd5607a3d9fb53/1462910484566/Crowdfunding-White-Paper.pdf?format-original.
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